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Perils of the Gray Zone
Paradigms Lost, Paradoxes Regained
By John Arquilla
In the long years since the 9/11 attacks on America, the wide-ranging “war on terror” has morphed into terror’s war on the world. Terrorist incidents have increased seven-fold, with the casualties caused by such attacks more than quintupling.1 Just as troubling, since the start of the current decade the over-
all number of wars under way has increased nearly a third—from 31 to 41.2 There is much overlap between 
the worst of these conflicts and the number of terrorist incidents, with Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen 
heading the list in recent years. Paradoxically, the first two of the countries listed have seen extended, very 
expensive, yet problematic American invasions and occupations. The American military footprint has been 
light in Syria and Yemen, but these wars have also proved vexing.
If these challenges were not enough, plaguing the lower end of the spectrum of conflict as they do, 
there are serious threats at the levels of the mid-range and major powers as well. Roguish regional states like 
Iran and North Korea each pose grave problems. The Islamist regime in Tehran oversees an arc of strategic 
involvement in wars ranging from Syria to the southern Arabian Peninsula; supports the vibrant, violent 
Hezbollah organization; and cultivates covert nodes, cells, and networks throughout the world.3 As for North 
Korea, Kim Jong Un’s vision is focused primarily on continuing his family’s totalitarian dynasty. But a key 
aspect of his strategy includes the development of a robust nuclear deterrent, something seen as highly threat-
ening in capitals ranging from Washington to Beijing.
Mention of Beijing is a reminder of the rise of China, and of its increasingly bumptious policies and 
actions—from reef enhancement to edgy sea patrols—in the East and South China Seas. The cyber domain 
is yet another area in which China’s behavior can only be described as highly aggressive, given the skill and 
systematic predations of its corps of hackers—whether they are part of Chinese officialdom or somehow 
just working at the behest of Beijing. Their ability to make off with vast amounts of intellectual property has 
resulted in their enjoying a greatly disproportionate share of what then Director, National Security Agency 
and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command General Keith Alexander called—while he was still in uniform—“the 
greatest transfer of wealth in history.”4 Needless to say, Russian and/or Russian-backed hackers have enjoyed a 
healthy share of these spoils as well.
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However, the Russian challenge goes well 
beyond cybercrime, to include serious acts of 
political warfare—specifically, of late, attempts to 
influence democratic elections—across many coun-
tries, not least the United States. The Russians have 
also reasserted their growing power in more mus-
cular though hardly conventional ways as well. Not 
only in their self-defined “near abroad”—reference 
should be made here to the bloodless annexation of 
Crimea and covert combat support to separatist reb-
els in Donetsk—but also in Moscow’s sharp military 
intervention in the bloody Syrian civil war. Thus, if 
we are not seeing a recrudescence of the Cold War, 
without doubt a kind of “cool war” has indeed set in.5
Given all the global turmoil, and the seeming 
inability of American power—even when enhanced 
by allies—to cope effectively with the wide range of 
these challenges, it is small wonder that strategists 
have been casting about in search of fresh paradigms 
and more innovative concepts of operations. For 
it is abundantly clear that “overwhelming force”—
the foundation of the grand strategic doctrine that 
bears General Colin Powell’s name—will not suffice 
against hidden networks, or nations that choose 
covert, unconventional action as their preferred 
modus operandi.
In an era featuring few stand-up fights, there is 
a premium on doctrinal innovation. Yet even while 
the various aggressors of the world seem to have 
truly grasped the need for and mastered the process 
of creativity, the United States and its allies have 
become mired in older habits of mind, manifesting 
an all-but-nostalgic longing for the return of tradi-
tional conventional warfare. The American defense 
budget is quite revealing of this mindset, with more 
than 90 percent of expenditures aimed at shoring up 
or expanding on conventional combat capabilities. 
Even the most generous views of support for U.S. 
Rehearsal of the parade in honor of Victory Day in Donetsk.
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Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), for 
example—including direct and “enabling” fund-
ing—have historically reflected little more than 3 
percent of the overall budget allocated to it, along 
with but 4 percent of monies dedicated to overseas 
contingency operations.6 In terms of personnel, 
USSOCOM’s estimated 70,000 service members 
constitute just 5 percent of the total active duty force.
However, there have been voices raised in recent 
years, pointing to the costly, problematic interven-
tions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise in global 
terrorist networks, and the evidence that mid-level 
and major powers are flexing their muscles in a 
mostly unconventional manner—hardly ever distin-
guishable as familiar traditional warfare. The effort 
to categorize this challenge has coalesced around a 
notion of gray zone conflict, a concept defined by 
strategist Hal Brands as an “activity that is coercive 
and aggressive in nature, but that is deliberately 
designed to remain below the threshold of conven-
tional military conflict.”7 A recent report by the 
International Security Advisory Board—a Federal 
Advisory Committee established to provide the 
Department of State independent insight, advice, 
and innovation—describes the gray zone more nar-
rowly as
the use of techniques to achieve a nation’s 
goals and frustrate those of its rivals by 
employing instruments of power—often 
asymmetric and ambiguous in charac-
ter—that are not direct use of acknowledged 
regular military forces.8
Whatever the differences in definition between 
these views—and those arising from myriad other 
gray zone studies—the emphasis on this zone being 
unconventional comes through loud and clear.
This prompts two questions: “why do we need 
the gray zone concept?” and “has the focus on 
today’s so-called gray zone resulted in a dangerous 
diversion of attention away from the accumulated 
body of knowledge about unconventional aspects 
of conflict developed over the past two hundred 
years?” The problems posed by irregular warfare 
in the 19th century, from Carl von Clausewitz’s 
notions of kleiner Krieg in the Napoleonic era to 
C.E. Callwell’s “small wars” during the heyday of 
colonialism, were deeply studied by these two, and 
many others.9 As to the anti-colonial guerrilla wars 
of the 20th century, these were closely examined 
by insurgents and counterinsurgents alike. Mao 
Zedong, Che Guevara, and Vo Nguyen Giap were 
undoubtedly the best guerrilla memoirists, respec-
tively, of Chinese, Cuban, and Vietnamese insurgent 
movements. The counterinsurgent perspective on 
the past century has perhaps been best exposited in 
remarkable works by David Galula, Otto Heilbrunn, 
and Lewis Gann.10 These are but a few of the highest 
peaks in a whole mountain range of studies of irreg-
ular warfare. In light of this existing literature, why 
is the gray zone concept needed? 
As to the second question, about diversion of 
attention away from accumulated knowledge of the 
subject of conflict “other than traditional conven-
tional warfare,” it seems that here too there is much 
cause for concern. Brands puts the matter succinctly, 
noting that “exaggerating the newness of the [gray 
zone] phenomenon risks muddling rather than 
sharpening our comprehension.”11
Paradigms Lost 
Beyond impairing our understanding of the current 
landscape of conflict, failure to recall and rely upon 
relevant security paradigms of the past—in favor 
of simply ginning up a new term for longstanding 
practices—has led to a sharp loss of earlier knowl-
edge and insight, consequences of which have surely 
played a significant role in the unsatisfying course 
of events described in the opening section of this 
article. It is with deep concern about the severe price 
paid by forgetting the substance and power of earlier 
security paradigms—an inattentiveness that plays 
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right into our enemies’ hands—that I provide the 
following reminders.
Perhaps the most important insight to recall 
and reflect on speaks to the very rise of an age of 
irregular warfare. This was predicted by political 
scientist Kenneth Waltz more than sixty years ago, 
when he observed that “mutual fear of big weapons 
may produce, instead of peace, a spate of smaller 
wars.”12 Journalist Robert Taber affirmed this view 
a decade later in his classic War of the Flea, which 
foretold the future dominance of insurgency and 
terror on the conflict spectrum. As Taber viewed the 
matter, a traditional military simply had “too much 
to defend, too small, ubiquitous and agile an enemy 
to come to grips with.”13 This insight resonated with 
bright jihadis, especially Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, the 
deepest strategic thinker that al-Qaeda produced. 
He used Taber’s work in his teachings during the 
1990s, when al-Qaeda ran a “university of terror” 
in Afghanistan.14 Waltz and Taber had hardly been 
heeded in the United States, and much too conven-
tional means were applied in Vietnam. A predictable 
debacle ensued, yet American thought still turned 
back to conventional war with development of an 
AirLand Battle doctrine after the communist over-
run of South Vietnam in 1975. And it would take 
more than 30 years—after 9/11 and in the middle of 
the insurgency in Iraq—before a new counterinsur-
gency manual was published.15
With regard to the notion of a blurriness 
between peace and war—a key aspect of the justifi-
cation for the gray zone concept—it is hardly new. 
Forty years ago Eliot Cohen was writing insightfully 
about “the blurring of war and peace . . . the strug-
gle to mobilize the populace . . .” and a “new era of 
warfare [differing] sharply from that which preceded 
it.”16 As to notions of covert action as means by which 
to effect regime change and pursue other political 
objectives, this portion of the gray zone was illumi-
nated, studied, and critiqued long ago. Given that 
the United States was an eager participant in this 
realm, it is hard to see why a new construct for this 
form of action is necessary. Indeed, a look back at 
the heyday of covert action, and its often problematic 
results—in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, Angola, 
and Nicaragua, to name just a few places where 
Americans plied this craft—might curb the future 
appetite for this dark mode of statecraft.17 Conversely, 
given the high failure rate of covert actions, excessive 
fear of others using them might be eased. 
In addition to covert action—a phenomenon 
closely associated with the world of intelligence 
and counterintelligence—the defined gray zone 
implicitly relates also to aspects of warfighting that 
extend well-beyond the aforementioned guerrilla 
operations. These modes of conflict are generally 
reflected by instances in which a nation chooses to 
counter or confront a potential adversary by invest-
ing in off-design technologies and highly innovative 
concepts of operations, rather than by imitating 
the structure and doctrine of the opposing forces. 
The best current example of such an approach can 
be found in Beijing’s strategy in the East and South 
China Seas. Instead of relying on aircraft carri-
ers—though the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
Navy now has two of them—Beijing is establishing 
a network of enhanced reefs, one with potential to 
exert control over these narrow seas with super-
sonic anti-ship missiles, brilliant mines, and attack 
aircraft based on or otherwise using them. By these 
varied means, Beijing is taking a highly asymmetric 
approach to dealing with American carrier-based 
power projection capabilities.
This notion of asymmetric warfare, pioneered 
more than 40 years ago by Andrew J.R. Mack, is 
one of those well-developed paradigms in dan-
ger of being lost as soldiers and statesmen flock to 
the gray zone. For Mack, the asymmetry was not 
only to be found in the concept of field operations 
but also in the combatants’ relative motivations. 
Key studies that have built upon his thinking, and 
advanced fresh ideas, have addressed both the 
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operational and the motivational dimensions.18 In 
the world today, these factors are much on display 
at all levels. Clearly, the Taliban see their campaign 
in Afghanistan as a total war for control of the state, 
while the U.S.-led coalition operates with a limited 
conflict in mind, seeking to “hold the line” with the 
minimum level of human and material resources 
expended. At the level of the major powers, Russia 
has a high level of commitment to holding the 
Crimea, and to supporting ethnic Russians in 
Donetsk, while NATO is clearly less determined to 
see any redress of the situation in favor of Ukraine. 
As to the United States and Britain, signatories 
to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security 
Assurances, which guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity, both major powers seem to be suffering 
from selective or strategic amnesia.19
As to terrorism, it seems that the gray zone 
concept is limited in its ability to help us grasp the 
strategic implications of the shift in this phenome-
non from its origins as a form of symbolic violence 
with some form of extortion in mind to a mode of 
conflict in its own right. On this point, though, it is 
clear that much earlier thinking on terrorism as an 
emerging form of warfare remains highly relevant. 
Indeed, the Baron von der Heydte—a German 
paratroop commander during World War II and 
an international legal scholar after—was among 
the first to see, in the wake of the Six-Day War in 
1967, that terrorism was becoming a form of “war 
out of the dark” in which “the decision is sought, 
and ultimately achieved, in a very large number 
of small, individual operations.”20 To say the least, 
the Baron was prescient. As was Claire Sterling, 
who observed back in the 1980s that terrorism was 
growing via networked forms of organization—and 
would continue to do so.21 The challenge in the great 
post–9/11 war among nations and terrorist networks 
is to understand the characteristics, including the 
strengths and vulnerabilities, of networks. The gray 
zone concept does little to achieve this. Sterling’s 
ideas do, and can form the basis for a counter-net-
work paradigm. Just as the Baron von der Heydte’s 
formulations provide a foundation for viewing the 
nature of the current era of conflict. 
Thus it seems clear that there are times when, 
in the words of Winston Churchill, “the farther back 
you can look, the farther ahead you will see.” This 
is such an era, an age of irregular warfare, terror, 
covert action, and other asymmetric modes of con-
flict. To confront and master these challenges, older, 
deeper, more developed concepts are likely to serve 
better than just freshly-minted terms. For example, 
Lewis Gann observed not only how often guerrillas 
have been defeated, but also the key elements upon 
which victory or defeat pivot in these wars. Beyond 
well-known factors like denying havens and inhib-
iting external support, Gann emphasized the largely 
psychological nature of guerrilla wars, railed against 
having counterinsurgent forces with “big admin-
istrative tails,” and suggested cost-effective ways to 
improve the ability to gain information critical to 
finding the hidden.22 Recent scholarship has power-
fully affirmed Gann’s views—especially about the 
frequency with which and conditions under which 
guerrillas can be and have been defeated.23
Otto Heilbrunn should also be mentioned. 
Almost 50 years ago, he provided an outstand-
ing analysis of the conditions favoring victory by 
the counterinsurgents over irregulars and, con-
versely, conditions associated with the likelihood 
of seeing an insurgent victory. Briefly, Heilbrunn 
identified three types of insurgencies: terrorist 
wars (e.g. Palestine); small-unit guerrilla wars (e.g. 
Malaya, Kenya, Greece, and Algeria); and large-
unit insurgencies (e.g. Tito, Mao, and Giap). He 
went on to argue that terrorist wars generally lead 
to stalemates—a point he made so long ago, yet 
which resonates quite powerfully today. Small-unit 
guerrila wars have been won, more often than not, 
by the counterinsurgents; whereas guerrillas have 
won all large-unit conflicts.24 Heilbrunn’s typology 
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of irregular wars and his analysis of them remain 
highly relevant, yet his work—and that of others 
who grappled with these challenges—will all too 
likely be forgotten or lost in the gray zone. Another 
example of the risk run by relabeling a longstand-
ing phenomenon. 
Paradoxes Regained 
As important as it is to take a retrospective view 
and search out still-valuable paradigms before they 
become totally lost or simply ignored out of existence, 
one must also remain attentive to the possibility of 
reemerging paradoxes. Perhaps the most nettlesome 
of the paradoxes is revealed by contemplation of the 
costly, all-too-often counterproductive results of 
American military interventions and foreign policy 
initiatives in the years since 9/11. This period, which 
began a decade after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, should by all traditional measures of power 
have seen American vital interests well-served and 
policy goals promptly achieved. Yet results have 
proved to be very far from satisfactory, with a seem-
ingly endless sea of troubles looming straight ahead. 
To be sure, part of the problem lies in the rise of 
irregular modes of conflict—but such challenges have 
been met and mastered in the past. Curiously, what 
may be adding to the difficulty in parsing them today 
is the very concept of the gray zone.
By creating the notion of a space that lies 
between war and peace, rather than simply rec-
ognizing the rise of irregular warfare to a leading 
position on the spectrum of conflict, American 
strategists have hobbled themselves, like horses 
whose tethered legs allow little movement. The 
failure to see that the gray zone is actually in and 
an essential part of the realm of war conveys huge 
advantages to insurgents, terrorist networks, and 
roguish nations. Understanding why this failure 
of perception has occurred reveals another par-
adox: how the Marxist worldview—that failed 
socially, politically, and economically—and a radical 
offshoot of Islam—that is overwhelmingly rejected 
by Muslims—have both come to life owing to the 
fuzzy thinking about conflict in the United States 
that has diffused among its allies and friends.
The problem with gray zone thinking is that it 
confounds the very paradigms that have generally 
guided the behavior of the world’s more progressive, 
or at least more advanced, nation-states. One foun-
dational body of thought is classical liberalism—not 
to be confused with today’s meaning of the word 
“liberal”—that grew from the economic thinking of 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Both favored free 
markets instead of the controls imposed by mercan-
tilist policies. And both saw the rational individual 
as the prime unit of analysis in commercial affairs. 
The heirs to their thinking became devoted to the 
“Manchester Creed,” a belief system based on the 
notion of an enduring harmony of interests. War in 
this paradigm is a clear aberration. Thus classical 
liberalism has a hard time with the notion of a gray 
zone between a harmony of interests and open con-
flict. Perhaps the best example of the great difficulty 
this world view has had with creeping aggression of 
the gray-zone sort is provided by the befuddlement 
of England, France, and even the League of Nations 
in the face of Nazi actions and annexations during 
the 1930s. Edward Hallett Carr, the great historian 
and analyst of this period, was the first to critique 
the liberal paradigm as inadequate, noting of this 
time that it was “no longer possible to believe that 
every state, by pursuing the greatest good of the 
whole world, is pursuing the greatest good of its own 
citizens, and vice versa.” He concluded that “[t]he 
inner meaning of the modern international crisis 
is the collapse of the whole structure of utopianism 
based on the concept of the harmony of interests.”25
Despite the travails of World War II and the 
Cold War, in the half-century between Hitler’s 
invasion of Poland in 1939 and the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 sustained efforts arose to rehabilitate 
notions of the harmony of interests. “Neoliberal” 
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thought, which emphasizes the importance of global 
institutions and agreements, operates under the 
assumption of harmony. As Robert Jervis has noted, 
neoliberals believe that the onset of armed conflict is 
just evidence that “international politics represents 
tragedy rather than evil.”26 Even the polar opposite 
of liberal thought, flinty Realism with its emphasis 
on power calculations in matters of war and peace, 
makes clear that there are “rules of the game” even at 
this level that are not lightly disregarded. The father 
of the realist school of thought, Hans Morgenthau, 
went so far as to argue “there is the misconcep-
tion . . . that international politics is so thoroughly 
evil that it is no use looking for ethical limitations of 
the aspirations for power.” Instead, he noted, it was 
more proper to focus on “the increasing awareness 
on the part of most statesmen of certain ethical lim-
itations restricting the use of war as an instrument 
of international politics.”27
The structural realists who have come after 
Morgenthau have seen war as a disturbance—what 
leading realist John Mearsheimer, echoing Jervis, 
describes as tragedy—of an equilibrium to be 
restored by balancing behavior.28 In sum, classic lib-
eralism and realism, along with their neoliberal and 
structural realist descendants, remain key, guiding 
paradigms that tend to see sharp, clearly delineated 
dividing lines between states of peace and war. The 
gray zone concept poses a challenge they are not 
particularly well-suited to address which may help 
to explain, in part, the difficulty liberal- and real-
ist-oriented policymakers have had in coping with 
the crises of the post–9/11 era.
By way of contrast, the seemingly defunct 
Marxist paradigm actually provides a more use-
ful way to think about the low-level conflicts that 
populate the gray zone and bedevil our time. Like 
classic liberalism, Marxism draws its basic tenets 
from economic analysis. But a key difference is that, 
whereas liberal thought was based on a belief in the 
harmony of interests, Marxism sees the world, in 
the phrasing of Jeffry Frieden and David Lake, as 
“necessarily conflictual.”29 And it is quite clear that 
Marxists did not simply see this conflict as limited 
to the economic realm. For V.I. Lenin a perpetual 
war was to be fought, often of subversion and vari-
ous forms of low-level violence. The aim was to meet 
what he described as “the preliminary condition 
for every people’s revolution . . . the smashing, the 
destruction of the ready-made State machine.”30 His 
successor Josef Stalin reaffirmed this point in his 
1924 monograph, “The Foundations of Leninism,” 
in which he argued “the law of violent proletarian 
revolution . . . is an inevitable law.” The coming of 
peace, he thought, could happen only “in the remote 
future, if the proletariat is victorious.”31
The gray zone construct, as noted earlier in 
the mention of formal definitions in current use, 
includes irregular and guerrilla war, as well as acts of 
terrorism. The Marxist paradigm makes no effort to 
employ such fine distinctions. Instead, all these phe-
nomena are forms of war. Mao Zedong argues this 
point unambiguously in his writings, affirming that 
“guerrilla operations must not be considered as an 
independent form of war. They are but one step in 
the total war.” He returns to this theme repeatedly, 
linking irregular warfare to overall goals, and finally 
concluding that “the strategy of guerrillas is insepa-
rable from war strategy as a whole.”32 Vietnam’s Vo 
Nguyen Giap, who was influenced to a significant 
degree by Mao’s thinking, adhered to this notion in 
his and Ho Chi Minh’s long, successful fight against 
the French and, later, the Americans.
For all the continuing value of Marxist stra-
tegic thought today—Russia and China, two heirs 
of Marx, are showing real mastery of our so-called 
gray zone—there is another conceptual paradox that 
has been regained: Islamism. And not just the odd, 
fringe beliefs so widely and overwhelmingly rejected 
by the world’s Muslims. Rather, the paradox is to be 
found in the rebirth of the early notion of the obliga-
tion to wage perpetual warfare against “unbelievers.” 
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This idea animated the first great sweep of Arab 
conquests in the 7th century and thereafter, shored 
up resistance to repeated “crusades,” and sparked 
continuing conflict that was waged for many centu-
ries in the Mediterranean, and at times beyond, by 
the corsairs of Barbary—who eventually ended up 
fighting U.S. Marines early in the 19th century. Of 
this true “long war” mentality Sir John Bagot Glubb, 
a soldier who did much service with Arab forces, 
wrote tellingly about how their forebears
swept irresistibly forward without organi-
zation, without pay, without plans, and 
without orders. They constitute a perpetual 
warning to technically advanced nations 
who rely for their defence on scientific prog-
ress rather than the human spirit.33
Could there be any more cautionary, telling 
explanation of the true antecedents of the zeal and 
tenacity modern Muslim extremists have shown 
since the great war between nations and terrorist 
networks erupted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on 
America? I don’t think so. Just like the heirs of Marx, 
today’s Islamist fighters see war as a quite unitary 
construct. A phenomenon that, from very early 
days, saw the jihadis skillfully blending conven-
tional and irregular modes of conflict. As G.E. von 
Grunebaum, a leading scholar of Islam from the 7th 
to the 13th centuries, observed, “guerrilla warfare, 
apart from several larger expeditions, continued 
without interruption.”34 Those who oppose the pres-
ent-day jihadis may try to slice and dice conflict in 
different ways, based on their habits of mind and 
institutional biases against treating something other 
than conventional war as “war.” But they do so at 
their increasing peril.
Conclusion 
This article has sharply critiqued the very notion 
of the “gray zone.” It is an intellectual construct 
that confuses rather than clarifies the spectrum of 
conflict, and plays into the hands of smart, moti-
vated aggressors who see war in simpler ways. That 
is, today’s aggressors are most willing to accept 
insurgency, terror, subversion and covert action 
as war—right alongside increasingly rare occur-
rences of conventional conflict. The irony of the 
situation is that the victors in the Cold War, the 
champions of democracy, modernization and the 
“new world order,” hamstring themselves by dith-
ering over new definitions for old concepts that 
an earlier generation of their own strategists had 
thought about deeply and insightfully. Meanwhile, 
the heirs of Marx and of classical militant Islam—
two paradigms long seen as defunct and widely 
rejected—come to 21st century conflict better 
prepared, in terms of mindset, for the waging of pro-
tracted war in all its many dimensions.
If we must have a fresh definition for war in 
this era—and I am still far from convinced that we 
should—let it be “hybrid warfare,” the term for pres-
ent and future conflict that then-Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates first used in 2009. He was no doubt 
inspired by “hybrid thinking” going on in the Marine 
Corps, and the thoughtful 2007 policy study by Frank 
Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of the 
Hybrid Wars. In it, he posed the prospect that “we 
can expect to face competitors who employ all forms 
of war and tactics, perhaps simultaneously.”35 At least 
this term recognizes the irregular as a full-blooded 
form of conflict, right alongside conventional war. 
Thus it gives those on the defensive—and make no 
mistake, the United States and its allies and friends 
are on the defensive—good reason to sharpen their 
wits in the face of aggressive actions by major powers 
and regional states, rogues, and terrorist and insur-
gent networks. There is a world war under way, waged 
in hot, cold, and cool modes. The aggressors see no 
gray zone “between war and peace.” They see all as 
war. So must we. Prism
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